Abstract. In this paper we describe a new identity-based signcryption (IBSC) scheme built upon bilinear maps. This scheme turns out to be more efficient than all others proposed so far. We prove its security in a formal model under recently studied computational assumptions and in the random oracle model. As a result of independent interest, we propose a new provably secure identity-based signature (IBS) scheme that is also faster than all known pairing-based IBS methods.
Introduction
Two fundamental services of public key cryptography are privacy and authentication. Public key encryption schemes aim at providing confidentiality whereas digital signatures must provide authentication and non-repudiation. Nowadays, noticeably, many real-world cryptographic application require those distinct goals to be simultaneously achieved. This motivated Zheng [39] to provide the cryptographer's toolbox with a novel cryptographic primitive which he called 'signcryption. ' The purpose of this kind of cryptosystem is to encrypt and sign data in a single operation which has a computational cost less than that of doing both operations sequentially. Proper signcryption schemes should provide confidentiality as well as authentication and non-repudiation. As in conventional encryption schemes, recovering the plaintext from a signcrypted message must be computationally infeasible without the recipients private key; as in conventional digital signatures, it must be computationally infeasible to create signcrypted texts without the senders private key.
Identity based cryptography has become a very fashionable area of research for the last couple of years. The concept was originally introduced in 1984 by Shamir [34] whose idea was that users within a system could use their online identifiers (combined with certain system-wide information) as their public keys. This greatly reduces the problems with key management that have hampered the mass uptake of public key cryptography on a per individual basis. While identity-based signature schemes (IBS) rapidly emerged [20, 23] after 1984 (see [5] for a thorough study of them), and despite another bandwidth-consuming proposal [18] , it is only in 2001 that bilinear mappings over elliptic curve were found to yield the first fully practical identity-based encryption (IBE) solution [10] . Those bilinear maps, or pairings, subsequently turned out to yield a plenty of cryptographic applications [2] among which several recent outstanding results on identity-based encryption [7, 8, 21, 36] .
Several identity-based signcryption algorithms have been proposed so far, e.g. [11, 14, 16, 17, 26, 27, 30, 33, 37] . Within this handful of results, only [11, 14, 16, 17, 26, 37] consider schemes supported by formal models and security proofs in the random oracle model [6] . Among them, Chen and Malone-Lee's proposal [14] happens to yield the most efficient construction.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a new identity-based signcryption scheme that even supersedes [14] from an efficiency point of view at the expense of a security resting on stronger assumptions. The new construction can benefit from the most efficient pairing calculation techniques for a larger variety of elliptic curves than previous schemes. Indeed, recent observations [35] pinpointed problems arising when many provably secure pairing based protocols are implemented using asymmetric pairings and ordinary curves. Our proposal avoids those problems thanks to the fact that it does not require to hash onto an elliptic curve cyclic subgroup. As a result of independent interest, we discovered a new identity-based signature that happens to be faster at verification than previously known IBS schemes. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic security theoretic concepts of bilinear map groups and the hard problems underlying our proposed algorithms. We describe our identity-based signature scheme and prove its security in section 3. We propose a new identity-based signcryption scheme in section 4, and compare its efficiency to various schemes in section 5. We draw our conclusions in section 6.
Preliminaries

Bilinear map groups and related computational problems
Let k be a security parameter and p be a k-bit prime number. Let us consider groups G 1 , G 2 and G T of the same prime order p and let P, Q be generators of respectively G 1 and G 2 . We say that (G 1 , G 2 , G T ) are bilinear map groups if there exists a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T satisfying the following properties:
There exists an efficient, publicly computable (but not necessarily invertible) isomorphism ψ :
Such bilinear map groups are known to be instantiable with ordinary elliptic curves such as those suggested in [29] or [4] . In this case, the trace map can be used as an efficient isomorphism ψ as long as G 2 is properly chosen [35] . With supersingular curves, symmetric pairings (i.e. G 1 = G 2 ) can be obtained and ψ is the identity. The computational assumptions for the security of our schemes were previously formalized by Boneh and Boyen [9, 7] and are recalled in the following definition.
Definition 1 ( [9, 7] ). Let us consider bilinear map groups (G 1 , G 2 , G T ) and generators P ∈ G 1 and Q ∈ G 2 .
The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman problem (q-SDHP) in the groups (G 1 , G 2 ) consists in, given a (q + 2)-tuple (P, Q, αQ, α 2 Q, . . . , α q Q) as input, finding a pair c,
A new identity-based signature
We here present a new identity-based signature that is significantly more efficient all known pairing based IBS schemes as its verification algorithm requires a single pairing calculation. This efficiency gain is obtained at the expense of letting the security rely on a stronger assumption than other provably secure pairing based IBS [12, 15, 24] .
Setup: given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses bilinear map groups (G 1 , G 2 , G T ) of prime order p > 2 k and generators Q ∈ G 2 , P = ψ(Q) ∈ G 1 , g = e(P, Q). It then selects a master key s R ← Z * p , a system-wide public key Q pub = sQ ∈ G 2 and hash functions
The scheme can be thought of as an identity-based extension of a digital signature discussed in two independent papers [9, 38] . More precisely, the method for obtaining private keys from identities is a simplification of a method suggested by Sakai and Kasahara ([33] ).
In [25] , Kurosawa and Heng described an identity-based identification (IBI) protocol that implicitly suggests an IBS described in appendix E and which can be proven secure under the same assumption as our proposal. It turns out that ours is slightly faster than the Kurosawa-Heng IBS in the signature generation.
At Eurocrypt'04, Bellare, Namprempre and Neven established a framework [5] for proving the security of a large family of identity-based signatures and they only found two schemes to which their framework does not apply. The present one does not either fall into the category of schemes to which it applies. Indeed, it can be showed that our IBS does not result from the transformation of any convertible standard identification or signature scheme (in the sense of [5] ) unless the q-SDHP is easy. A direct security proof is thus needed.
Security results
We recall here the usual model [5, 12, 15, 19, 24] of security for identity-based signatures which is an extension of the usual notion of existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks [22] .
Definition 2 ([12]
). An IBS scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message and identity attacks if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary has a non-negligible advantage in this game:
1. The challenger runs the setup algorithm to generate the system's parameters and sends them to the adversary. 2. The adversary F performs a series of queries to the following oracles:
-Key extraction oracle: returns private keys for arbitrary identities.
-Signature oracle: produces signatures on arbitrary messages using the private key corresponding to arbitrary identities. 3. F produces a triple (ID * , M * , σ * ) made of an identity ID * , whose private key was never extracted, and a message-signature pair (M * , σ * ) such that (M * , ID * ) was not submitted to the signature oracle. She wins if the verification algorithm accepts the triple (ID * , M * , σ * ).
The next lemmas establish the security of the scheme under the q-SDH assumption. Lemma 1 [12] allows to only consider a weaker attack where a forger is challenged on a given identity chosen by the challenger. The proof of lemma 2 relies on the forking lemma [31, 32] .
Lemma 1 ([12]).
If there is a forger F 0 for an adaptively chosen message and identity attack having advantage ǫ 0 against our scheme when running in a time t 0 and making q h1 queries to random oracle h 1 , then there exists an algorithm F 1 for an adaptively chosen message and given identity attack which has advantage
within a running time t 1 ≤ t 0 . Moreover, F 1 asks the same number key extraction queries, signature queries and H 2 -queries as F 0 does. Lemma 2. Let us assume that there is an adaptively chosen message and given identity attacker F that makes q hi queries to random oracles H i (i = 1, 2) and q s queries to the signing oracle. Assume that, within a time t, F produces a forgery with probability ǫ ≥ 10(q s + 1)(q s + q h2 )/2 k . Then, there exists an algorithm B that is able to solve the q-SDHP for q = q h1 in an expected time
where τ mult denotes the cost of a scalar multiplication in G 2 and τ p is the cost of a pairing evaluation.
Proof. See appendix A.
⊓ ⊔
The combination of the above lemmas yields the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let us assume that there exists an adaptively chosen message and identity attacker F making q hi queries to random oracles H i (i = 1, 2) and q s queries to the signing oracle. Assume that, within a time t, F produces a forgery with probability ǫ ≥ 10(q s + 1)(q s + q h2 )/2 k . Then, there exists an algorithm B that is able to solve the q-SDHP for q = q h1 in an expected time
where τ mult and τ p respectively denote the cost of a scalar multiplication in G 2 and the required time for a pairing evaluation.
Fast identity-based signcryption
Formal model of identity-based signcryption
The formal structure that we shall use for identity-based signcryption schemes is the following.
Setup: is a probabilistic algorithm run by a private key generator (PKG) that takes as input a security parameter to output public parameters params and a master key mk that is kept secret. Keygen: is a key generation algorithm run by the PKG on input of params and the master key mk to return the private key S ID associated to the identity ID. Sign/Encrypt: is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input public parameters params, a plaintext message M , the recipient's identity ID R , and the sender's private key S IDS , and outputs a ciphertext σ = Sign/Encrypt(M, S IDS , ID R ).
Decrypt/Verify: is a deterministic decryption algorithm that takes as input a ciphertext σ, public parameters params, the receiver's private key S IDR and (optionally) a sender's identity ID S before returning a valid messagesignature pair (M, s) or a distinguished symbol ⊥ if σ does not decrypt into a message bearing signer ID S 's signature.
Unlike recent works of [11, 14] that present two-layer designs of probabilistic signature followed by a deterministic encryption, our construction is a singlelayer construction jointly achieving signature and encryption on one side and decryption and verification on the other side. Although the description of our scheme could be modified to fit a two-layer formalism, we kept the monolithic presentation without hampering the non-repudiation property as, similarly to [11, 14] , our construction enables an ordinary signature on the plaintext to be extracted from any properly formed ciphertext using the recipient's private key.
The extracted message-signature pair can be forwarded to any third party in such a way that a sender remains committed to the content of the plaintext. Unlike models of [11, 14] that consider anonymous ciphertexts, the above one assumes that senders' identities are sent in the clear along with ciphertexts. Actually, receivers do not need to have any a priori knowledge on whom the ciphertext emanates from in our scheme but this simply allows more efficient reductions in the security proofs. A simple modification of our scheme yields anonymous ciphertexts and enables senders' identities to be recovered by the Decrypt/Verify algorithm (which only takes a ciphertext and the recipient's private key as input). 1. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm on input of a security parameter k and sends the domain-wide parameters params to the A. 2. In a find stage, A starts probing the following oracles:
-Keygen: returns private keys associated to arbitrary identities.
-Sign/Encrypt: given a pair of identities ID S , ID R and a plaintext M , it returns an encryption under the receiver's identity ID R of the message M signed in the name of the sender ID S . -Decrypt/Verify: given a pair of identities (ID S , ID R ) and a ciphertext σ, it generates the receiver's private key S ID R = Keygen(ID R ) and returns either a valid message-signature pair (M, s) for the sender's identity ID S or the ⊥ symbol if, under the private key S ID R , σ does not decrypt into a valid message-signature pair. A's advantage is defined as Adv(
The next definition, given in [11] , considers non-repudiation w.r.t. signatures embedded in ciphertexts rather than w.r.t. ciphertexts themselves.
Definition 4. An identity-based signcryption scheme (IBSC) is said to be existentially signature-unforgeable against adaptive chosen messages and ciphertexts attacks (ESUF-IBSC-CMA) if no PPT adversary can succeed in the following game with a non-negligible advantage:
1. the challenger runs the Setup algorithm on input k and gives the system-wide public key to the adversary F. In both of these definitions, we consider insider attacks [1] . Namely, in the definition of message confidentiality, the adversary is allowed to be challenged on a ciphertext created using a corrupted sender's private key whereas, in the notion of signature non-repudiation, the forger may output a ciphertext computed under a corrupted receiving identity.
The scheme
Our scheme is obtained from an optimized combination of our IBS scheme with the most basic version of the Sakai-Kasahara IBE ( [33, 13] ) which is only secure against chosen-plaintext attacks when used as an encryption-only system. This allows performing the signature-encryption operation without computing a pairing whereas only two pairings have to be computed upon decryption/verification. Setup: given k, the PKG chooses bilinear map groups (G 1 , G 2 , G T ) of prime order p > 2 k and generators Q ∈ G 2 , P = ψ(Q) ∈ G 1 , g = e(P, Q) ∈ G T . It then chooses a master key s R ← Z * p , a system-wide public key Q pub = sQ ∈ G 2 and hash functions
Decrypt/Verify: given σ = c, S, T , and some sender's identity ID A , 1. Compute r = e(T, S IDB ), M = c ⊕ H 3 (r), and h = H 2 (M, r). 2. Accept the message iff r = e(S, H 1 (ID A )Q + Q pub )g −h . If this condition holds, return the message M and the signature (h, S) ∈ Z * p × G 1 . If required, the anonymity property is obtained by scrambling the sender's identity ID A together with the message at step 1 of Sign/Encrypt in such a way that the recipient retrieves it at the first step of the reverse operation. This change does not imply any computational penalty in practice but induces more expensive security reductions. In order for the proof to hold, ID A must be appended to the inputs of H 2 .
Security results
The following theorems claim the security of the scheme in the random oracle model under the same irreflexivity assumption as Boyen's scheme [11] : the signature/encryption algorithm is assumed to always take distinct identities as inputs (in other words, a principal never encrypts a message bearing his signature using his own identity).
Theorem 2. Assume that an IND-IBSC-CCA adversary
A has an advantage ǫ against our scheme when running in time τ , asking q hi queries to random oracles H i (i = 1, 2, 3), q se signature/encryption queries and q dv queries to the decryption/verification oracle. Then there is an algorithm B to solve the q-BDHIP for q = q h1 with probability
)τ mult +O(q dv q h2 )τ exp where τ exp and τ mult are respectively the costs of an exponentiation in G T and a multiplication in G 2 whereas τ p is the complexity of a pairing computation.
Proof. See appendix B.
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 3. Assume there exists an ESUF-IBSC-CMA attacker A that makes q hi queries to random oracles H i (i = 1, 2, 3), q se signature/ encryption queries and q dv queries to the decryption/verification oracle. Assume also that, within a time τ , A produces a forgery with probability ǫ ≥ 10(q se + 1)(q se + q h2 )/2 k . Then, there is an algorithm B that is able to solve the q-SDHP for q = q h1 in expected time
where τ mult , τ exp and τ p denote the same quantities as in theorem 2.
Proof. See appendix C.
⊓ ⊔
We now restate theorem 2 for the variant of our scheme with anonymous ciphertexts. The simulator's worst-case running time is affected by the fact that, when handling Decrypt/Verify requests, senders'identities are not known in advance. The reduction involves a number of pairing calculations which is quadratic in the number of adversarial queries.
Theorem 4.
Assume that an IND-IBSC-CCA adversary A has an advantage ǫ against our scheme when running in time τ , asking q hi queries to random oracles H i (i = 1, 2, 3) , q se signature/encryption queries and q dv queries to the decryption/verification oracle. Then there is an algorithm B to solve the q-BDHIP for q = q h1 with probability
)τ exp where τ exp , τ mult and τ p denote the same quantities as in previous theorems.
Proof. See appendix D.
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 3 can be similarly restated as its reduction cost is affected in the same way.
A formal proof of ciphertext anonymity in the model of [11] will be given in the full version of this paper for the anonymous version of the scheme.
We concede that even the latter variant does not feature all the properties of the systems of Boyen ([11] ) or Chen-Malone-Lee ( [14] ). For example, it does not have the ciphertext unlinkability property ( [11, 14] ): it seems infeasible for anyone to use his private key to embed a given message-signature pair into a proper ciphertext intended to himself. We were also unable to formally establish the ciphertext authentication property according to which a ciphertext is always signed and encrypted by the same person and cannot be subject to a kind of 'man-in-the-middle' attack. Nevertheless, the scheme does seem to have this property because of the same reason that precludes the ciphertext unlinkability property.
Overall, we believe that the scheme does satisfy the main requirements that might be desired in practice. In our opinion, it suffices to implement most practical applications and its great efficiency renders it more than interesting for identity-based cryptography.
Efficiency discussions and comparisons
In [35] , Smart and Vercauteren pointed out problems that arise when several pairing based protocols are implemented with asymmetric pairings. They showed the difficulty of finding groups G 2 allowing the use of the most efficient pairing calculation techniques for ordinary curves [3] if arbitrary strings should be efficiently hashed onto them and efficient isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 must be available at the same time. As a consequence, several protocols have to be implemented with groups for which no efficient isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 is computable and their security eventually has to rely on somewhat unnatural assumptions.
Except [33] that has no security proof (and actually has several known security problems [28] ), all known identity-based signcryption schemes would require to hash onto G 2 if they were instantiated with asymmetric pairings. Our scheme avoids this problem since it does not require to hash onto a cyclic group. It thus more easily benefits from optimized pairing calculation algorithms. For example, section 4 of [35] yields an example of group G 2 for which techniques of [3] can be used and where efficient isomorphisms are available. ( †) One pairing is precomputable, incurring for each user a storage cost of one GT element for each other user in the system.
( ‡) One pairing is precomputable, incurring for each user a storage cost of one GT element for each other user in the system, plus one GT exponentiation.
(⋆) Two pairings are precomputable, incurring for each user a storage cost of one GT element for each user in the system, plus two GT exponentiations.
( §) One of the scalar multiplications is done in Q rather than P where (P, Q) generates E[p].
( ¶) Universally verifiable scheme (i.e. supports public ciphertext validation).
(♣) These schemes suffer from security problems as mentioned in [26, 28] .
(♠) This scheme does not provide insider-security for the message-confidentiality criterion.
(♦) This scheme has no security proof.
(⊲⊳) This construction can only authenticate messages from the receiver's point of view.
We now assess the comparative efficiency of several identity-based signcryption schemes, implemented according to their original descriptions. Table 1 summarises the number of relevant basic operations underlying several identity-based signcryption and signature schemes, namely, G T exponentiations, scalar point multiplications, and pairing evaluations, and compares the observed processing times (in milliseconds) for a supersingular curve of embedding degree k = 6 over F 3 97 , using implementations written in C++ and run on an Athlon XP 2 GHz. Subtleties in the algorithms determine somewhat different running times even when the operation counts for those algorithms are equal. We see from these results that our proposed algorithms rank among the fastest schemes.
Conclusion
We have described efficient and provably secure signature and signcryption schemes that are faster than any pairing-based scheme previously proposed in the literature. The latter can be instantiated with either named or anonymous ciphertexts and is more convenient than previous proposals for implementations with asymmetric pairings.
A Proof of lemma 2
Proof. We first show how to provide the adversary with a consistent view and we then explain how to apply the forking lemma.
Algorithm B takes as input (P, Q, αQ, α 2 Q, . . . , α q Q) and aims to find a pair (c, 
It sets generators H
The pairs (w i , 1 α+wi G) are computed using the left member of (1). B is then ready to answer F's queries along the course of the game. It first initializes a counter ℓ to 1 and launches F on the input (H pub , ID * ) for a randomly chosen challenge identity ID * R ← {0, 1} * . For simplicity, we assume that queries to H 1 are distinct, and that any query involving an identifier ID is preceded by the random oracle query H 1 (ID).
-H 1 -queries on an identity ID ∈ {0, 1} * : B returns a random w * R ← Z * p if ID = ID * . Otherwise, B answers w = w ℓ ∈ Z * p and increments ℓ. In both cases, B stores (ID, w) (where w * = w or w ℓ ) in a list L 1 . -Key extraction queries on ID = ID * : B recovers the matching pair (ID, w) from L 1 and returns the previously computed (1/(α + w))G.
-Signature query on a message-identity pair (M, ID): Q ID )e(G, H) −h , where Q ID = H 1 (ID)H + H pub , and backpatches to define the value H 2 (M, r) as h ∈ Z * p (B aborts in the unlikely event that H 2 (M, r) is already defined).
We have explained how to simulate F's environment in a chosen-message and given identity attack. We are ready to apply the forking lemma that essentially says the following: consider a scheme producing signatures of the form (M, r, h, S), where each of r, h, S corresponds to one of the three moves of a honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocol. Let us assume that a chosen-message attacker F forges a signature (M, r, h, S) in a time t with probability ǫ ≥ 10(q s + 1)(q s + q h )/2 k (k being a security parameter so that h is uniformly taken from a set of 2 k elements) when making q s signature queries and q h random oracle calls. If the triples (r, h, S) can be simulated without knowing the private key, then there exists a Turing machine F ′ that uses F to produce two valid signatures (m, r, h 1 , S 1 ), (m, r, h 2 , S 2 ), with h 1 = h 2 , in expected time 
and hence
i=0 γ i z i and eventually computes
before returning the pair (w * , σ * ) as a result. It finally comes that, if F forges a signature in a time t with probability ǫ ≥ 10(q s + 1)(q s + q h2 )/2 k , B solves the q-SDHP in expected time
where the last term accounts for the cost of the preparation phase. ⊓ ⊔
B Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Algorithm B takes as input P, Q, αQ, α 2 Q, . . . , α q Q and attempts to extract e(P, Q) We obtain the announced bound by noting that B selects the correct element from L 2 or L 3 with probability 1/(2q h2 + q h3 ). Its workload is dominated by O(q 2 h1 ) multiplications in the preparation phase, O(q se +q dv ) pairing calculations and O(q dv q h2 ) exponentiations in G T in its emulation of the Sign/Encrypt and Decrypt/Verify oracles.
⊓ ⊔
C Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. The proof is almost similar to the one of theorem 1. Namely, it shows that a forger in the ESUF-IBSC-CMA game implies a forger in a chosen-message and given identity attack. Using the forking lemma [31, 32] , the latter is in turn shown to imply an algorithm to solve the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman problem. More precisely, queries to the Sign/Encrypt and Decrypt/Verify oracles are answered as in the proof of theorem 2 and, at the outset of the game, the simulator chooses public parameters in such a way that it can extract private keys associated to any identity but the one which is given as a challenge to the adversary. By doing so, thanks to the irreflexivity assumption, it is able to extract clear messagesignature pairs from ciphertexts produced by the forger (as it knows the private key of the receiving identity ID * R ). ⊓ ⊔
D Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The simulator is the same as in theorem 2 with the following differences (recall that senders' identities are provided as inputs to H 2 ).
-H 2 -queries on input (ID S , M, r): B returns the previously defined value if it exists and a random h 2 R ← Z * p otherwise. To anticipate subsequent Decrypt/Verify requests, B simulates oracle H 3 to obtain h 3 = H 3 (r) ∈ {0, 1} n+n0 (where n 0 is the maximum length of identity strings) and stores (ID S , M, r, h 2 , c = (M ID S ) ⊕ h 3 , γ = r · e(G 1 , G 2 ) h2 ) in list L 2 .
